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In this paper I will analyse some aspects of the relationship between the 
economy and politics in the new democracies. I am going to study this rela­
tionship from two perspectives in order to determine, firstly, whether politics 
affects economic performance, and secondly, whether this in turn has political 
consequences. I will begin by examining the effects economies have on 
regimes, in order to discover if economic development fosters democratiza­
tion, if, on the contrary, this stabilizes dictatorships, or rather, whether it is 
the economic failure of dictatorships which leads to democracy. Secondly, I 
will study the effects of regimes on the economy, to see if it is possible to dif­
ferentiate between the efficiency of dictatorships and democracies, and if so, 
how these differences might be explained.
We live in a period of exceptional experimentation in democracy and politi­
cal institutions. The number of democracies doubled during the fifteen years 
after the ‘revolution of the carnations’ in Portugal in April 1974. Competitive 
elections were held in Portugal, Greece and Spain; in Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, Peru, and the Philippines; in South Korea; 
in Pakistan; in Turkey; in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe; and in 
the federations of the former Soviet Union. Yet in the majority of these coun­
tries the emergence of new democracies coincided with major economic crises 
which were particularly acute in countries such as Brazil, Argentina, Peru, 
Hungary, Poland, or Yugoslavia. This combination of political and economic 
transformations poses an enormous challenge to the social sciences. What can 
they tell us about the viability of different institutions, the cultural character­
istics which influence the consolidation or ‘quality’ of democracies, or the re­
lationships between the economy and politics, between efficiency and legiti­
macy? To what extent can they help us to interpret scenarios, to identify and 
evaluate different alternatives, to take decisions? The challenge is all the 
greater since democracies are now established very rapidly. Whilst in Britain 
democratization took two centuries, the slowest contemporary processes (for 
example in Brazil or Poland) have lasted ten years, whilst the fastest (as in the 
cases of Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Argentina or Greece) have taken just a few 
days. Democratization no longer consists of a slow and gradual evolution, 
during which the participants can negotiate the rules of the game and establish 
systems of mutual guarantees. The time-scale in Robert Dahl’s analysis of the 
establishment of democratic regimes has been drastically reduced: the se­




























































































mass participation1. It is possible, therefore, that the accumulated knowledge 
of the social sciences, the comparison of experiences, and the availability of 
models, may compensate for the brevity of the time available to construct 
viable democracies.
This paper presents a very general analysis of the relationship between the 
economy and politics in democratization processes, examining the two sides of 
this relationship, in other words, the dual direction of causality. What effect 
do economies have on regimes? And what effect do regimes have on 
economies?
1. The economic conditions of democratization
Let us begin with the first side of the problem: the economy as a cause of 
democracy. The question can be put as follows: is political change generated 
by economic development or by economic crisis? Is it due to economic success 
or failure? As is often the case in the social sciences, both explanations have 
coexisted somewhat paradoxically. Two mutually exclusive causes have been 
put forward to explain democratization. That is, both development and crisis 
have been used to explain the same result, namely the collapse of dictatorships 
and the establishment of democratic regimes.
Perhaps the most long-standing thesis is that which presents development as 
a cause of democracy. This thesis has been supported by extensive empirical 
evidence, mainly drawn from comparative quantitative studies. Following 
Seymour Martin Lipset’s seminal work2, almost thirty studies of this type have 
been carried out covering a wide range of different countries. On the basis of 
the statistical analysis of a small number of variables, their empirical general­
izations have repeatedly concluded that economic growth facilitates democrati­
zation. However, this thesis contains a number of weak points derived from 
the logic of the argument and the evidence on which it is based.
The relationship between economic development and political democracy 
has frequently been understood in functional terms. Democracy ‘requires’ a
1 Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1971), chp. 3.
2 Seymour Martin Lipset, ‘Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development 




























































































certain level of economic development whilst, in turn, there comes a point 
when economic development ‘requires’ democratic institutions. This vision has 
been shared by various traditions within the social sciences. In this way, a 
marxist would reason that the development of the forces of production has 
political consequences, and that, as Lenin affirmed in State and Revolution, 
democracy constitutes the best ‘shell’ for capitalism. Meanwhile, a functionalist 
would argue that societies are systems of interrelated, functionally integrated 
institutions which must always maintain a necessary ‘degree of fit’. In this 
way, political change would consist of an adjustment to a prior economic 
change. Thus, the logic of this type of explanation leads to the conclusion that 
there are certain specific requisites for democracy, that only when these are 
met will democracy be possible (that is, will it appear and survive), but also 
that when these requisites are satisfied the result will necessarily be democ­
racy.
Let us examine the reasoning according to which democracy is generated by 
economic development in a little more detail. The relationship between the 
economy and politics is presented in terms of probability. The most important 
empirical studies of democratizations do not defend the existence of a mechan­
ical, deterministic relationship between economic development and democracy. 
Rather, they merely affirm that if the former takes place, the probability of 
the latter occurring increases3. No law of destiny guarantees that a developed 
country will be democratic, or a poor country a dictatorship. If the causality is 
weak, this is because it reflects the considerable room for manoeuvre societies 
enjoy in the face of the determinism of the structural conditions. Economic 
development would only favour democracy, and exceptions would always ex­
3 The following are just some examples of this type of argument from the last few decades. 
In 1959 Lipset maintained that ‘democracy is related to the state of economic develop­
ment.. And the factors subsumed under economic development carry with it the political 
correlate of democracy.’ More than thirty years later he reasserted the same thesis: “The 
available data on economic levels and democratization suggests ... that the correlation 
between them is more pronounced in the early 1980s than in the late 1950s.’ Seymour 
Martin Lipset, ‘Some Social Requisites of Democracy’, pp. 75 and 80; Seymour Martin 
Lipset, Kyoung-Ryung Seong, and John C. Torres, ‘A Comparative Analysis of the So­
cial Requisites of Democracy’, International Social Science Journal, 136 (1993), p. 157. 
Bollen and Jackman suggest that ‘the level of economic development has a pronounced 
effect on political democracy, even when other non-economic factors are considered.’ 
Kenneth A. Bollen and Robert W. Jackman, “Economic and Non-economic Determinants 
of Political Democracy”, Research in Political Sociology 1 (1985), p. 38.
In a study covering 125 countries between 1960 and 1985, Helliwell indicated that 
‘countries at higher income levels are more likely to have democratic forms of govern­
ment.’ John F. Helliwell, ‘Empirical Linkages between Democracy and Economic 
Growth’, Working Paper n° 4066 (Cambridge, MA., National Bureau of Economic Re­




























































































ist: Germany in the 1930s, for example, or conversely, India or Costa Rica. 
Thus, economic development would not be a sufficient cause of democracy4, 
nor would the relationship exclude the possibility of involutions of political 
regimes taking place despite economic development. Nor, moreover, would 
the relationship be linear, whether over time or among countries with differ­
ent levels of development. The probabilities of democratization would increase 
during certain phases of economic development and decline in others5, and 
they would not increase before a certain minimum threshold is reached, nor 
after a maximum has been surpassed. These economic ‘thresholds’ of democ­
racy correspond to what Samuel P. Huntington has labelled ‘the transition 
zone’: on entering this, the prospects for democratization multiply. Huntington 
developed this argument in relation to countries at an intermediate level of 
development, precisely those that have accounted for two thirds of all the 
democratizations which have taken place since 1974. After a period of growth, 
these countries entered this ‘transition zone’; as a result, in three out of four 
cases they had established democratic regimes fifteen years later. In 
Huntington’s words: ‘In considerable measure, the wave of democratizations 
that began in 1974 was the product of the economic growth of the previous 
two decades’6. According to this thesis, sooner or later developmental dicta­
torships usually discover that the aspirations of their societies are not only 
confined to the sphere of consumption, but also encompass liberties and politi­
cal rights.
The causal effect of economic development on political democratization 
would operate indirectly, through a variety of intermediate variables. In this 
way, as an economy develops it also becomes more complex, and hence more 
difficult to manage under authoritarian institutions. As Dahl argues, the long­
term performance of an advanced economy will be less productive under co­
ercion than if based on voluntary compliance; that is, authoritarian diktats will 
be less efficient than collective negotiation7. Moreover, the social order will 
also become more plural, and in consequence resources will become less con­
4 In 1971 Dahl emphasized the probabilistic character of the relationship, a point which has 
subsequently been noted by most authors. See for instance, Lipset, Seong, and Torres, ‘A 
Comparative Analysis’, pp. 156, 158, 170.
5 Lipset originally argued that the relationship was linear. Subsequently, Robert. W. 
Jackman suggested that it was curvilinear in 'On the Relation of Economic Development to 
Democratic Performance’, American Journal o f Political Science, 17 (1973), pp. 611-21. 
Finally, Lipset, Seong, and Torres have described it as N-shaped, with probability declin­
ing after an initial period of development and then rising again in a later phase.
6 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century 
(Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p. 61.



























































































centrated, coercion less viable, and demands for political pluralism more 
intense. Thus, social groups and organisations will acquire greater autonomy 
from the state, the number of intermediate associations will multiply, civil 
society will become stronger, a new equilibrium will be achieved in the rela­
tionship between this and the state, and new patterns of negotiation will replace 
the relations of imposition. Social polarization will be reduced; the improve­
ment of a group’s living standards will no longer be a zero-sum game, in 
which one group may only benefit at the expense of another; and the middle 
classes will also become a more important force in the stratification system. 
The development of communications and education will strengthen society’s 
collective capacity to exercise the rights of citizenship. And these economic 
and social conditions will eventually influence values, fostering tolerance, trust 
and feelings of personal efficacy, which, in turn, are seen as the cultural foun­
dations of democracy8.
Some of these intermediate variables, however, may not only depend on the 
level of economic development. Social reforms, for example, may distribute 
resources in very different ways. Poor countries are not inevitably character­
ized by the concentration of resources, the submissiveness of their societies, 
and extensive illiteracy. Factors other than the increased resources brought by 
development may enable these conditions to be altered. Hence it is possible for 
democracy to become established in these countries if material needs and social 
inequality are reduced. In this way, social policies and education acquire a 
specific value; a functionalist would consider them to be functional alternatives 
to economic development. As a result, development would not be a necessary 
cause of democratization. These empirical studies do recognize this possibil­
ity9: in fact, this is the basis of many of the hopes of survival that a democracy 
may hold in a poor country.
There is a further reason why the economy affects dictatorships. The more 
dictatorships claim legitimacy on the grounds of performance rather than ide­
ology, the more vulnerable they become to economic crises. This vulnerability 
not only affects governments but also the regimes themselves. For as 
Huntington has argued, under authoritarianism the ‘legitimacy of the rulers’
8 Besides Dahl, see Alex Inkeles and Larry Diamond, ‘Personal Development and National 
Development: A Cross-National Perspective’, in Alexander Szalai and Frank M. Andrews 
(eds.). The Quality o f Life (London, Sage, 1990); Larry Diamond, ‘Economic Develop­
ment and Democracy Reconsidered’, in Gary Marks and Larry Diamond (eds.). 
Reexamining Democracy (Newbury Park, CA., Sage, 1992), pp. 117-19.
9 In this sense Helliwell writes that ‘schooling goes some distance in explaining the varia­





























































































(based on performance) overlaps with ‘procedural legitimacy’, (based on the 
rules of the game). When the former collapses, so too does the latter. In 
democracies, in contrast, the two are more clearly differentiated, hence it is 
possible to change the government whilst preserving the regime. A double 
legitimacy crisis of this type preceded the transitions in Southern and Eastern 
Europe, in Argentina, Uruguay, Peru, Brazil, and the Philippines. After 
examining 23 governments in East and South-Eastern Asia, Latin America, 
and Africa, Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman have shown that 
‘authoritarian regimes tended to rely more heavily than democratic ones on 
purely instrumental appeals and were thus particularly vulnerable to 
“legitimation crises” when economic conditions turned sour’10. Appeals of this 
kind can only be made as long as economic growth continues: when it stops, 
the crisis will also be political.
Thus, democracy appears to be an ‘unintended consequence’ of economic 
development, the result of a contradictory combination of economic success 
and political obsolescence. By developing their economies, dictatorships sew 
the seeds of their own destruction. In Dahl’s words ‘the more they 
[dictatorships] succeed in transforming the economy, (and with it, inevitably, 
society), the more they are threatened with political failure’11.
These are the main arguments defended by a long tradition of comparative 
quantitative research. Nearly all of the thirty odd studies produced over the 
last three decades have reached similar conclusions12. Accordingly, these 
should probably be taken as the frame of reference for any analysis of the 
economic conditions for democratization13. In this way, when the experiences 
of Spain, Portugal, Greece, Hungary, Poland, or the Czech Republic are exam­
ined, we need to verify whether democratization was preceded by high rates of 
economic growth and took place when these countries had reached certain 
‘thresholds’ of development; whether the political institutions of the dictator­
ships found it increasingly difficult to manage their economies (in Eastern 
Europe because these were both communist economies and political dictator­
ships); whether economic change generated more plural social orders and
111 Stephen Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman (eds.), The Politics o f Economic Adjustment 
(Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 330.
11 Dahl, Polyarchy, p. 78.
12 A chronological list of these studies is given in Appendix 1.
13 For an example of comparative historical research that takes these empirical generalizations 
as its frame of reference, see Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne H. Stephens, and John D. 





























































































stronger and more autonomous civil societies; whether the material and cul­
tural evolution of these societies reduced polarization and fuelled the extension 
of democratic values; and whether the problems of economic performance 
provoked a crisis of legitimacy for deideologized dictatorships.
Taking these comparative studies and their quantitative generalizations as 
the frame of reference does not imply that we are unaware of their many the­
oretical and empirical problems. The use of very aggregate data has often led 
to oversimplified classifications of complex national experiences. Stereotypes 
have been abundantly used; thus, many authors have argued that all economi­
cally developed countries now have democratic regimes, with the sole excep­
tions of Singapore and the Gulf States, and that economic development seems 
to have facilitated democratization processes such as those of Southern Europe, 
Chile, or South Korea. However this interpretation substantially misrepresents 
the political processes in these countries. I have challenged elsewhere such in­
terpretations of political change in Southern Europe. As for South Korea, this 
explanation overlooks the fact that for the Park Chung Hee government eco­
nomic growth (averaging 7 per cent per annum between 1967 and 1987) was 
an instrument for the maintenance of authoritarian rule, and that the democra­
tization process which eventually brought twenty-six years of dictatorship to 
an end was largely due to the growing strength of the opposition, the political 
incompetence of President Chun Doo Hwan, and a radically different interna­
tional situation. As for Chile, the country had a long history of democracy 
before Pinochet’s coup d’état in 1973, and in the mid-1980s it had yet to 
recover the level of economic development it had enjoyed in 1970.
Many of the comparative quantitative studies whose conclusion is that they 
have demonstrated an acceptable causality14 merely show a weak and rough 
statistical correlation, and the accuracy of their measurements is often spuri­
ous. The definition of indicators and the selection of countries and chronologi­
cal periods have always proved problematic15. The dependent and independent 
variables are not always clearly specified; for example, it is sometimes unclear 
whether the explanation refers to the emergence or the persistence of democ­
racies, or whether the independent variable is the level of development or the 
rate of growth. The direction of causality can also be confusing; it is not
14 Although almost half the variance remains unexplained.
15 For example, Phillips Cutright mixed measurements of democracy with measurements of 
political stability in ‘National Political Development; Measurement and Analysis', Ameri­
can Sociological Review, 28 (1963), pp. 253-64. Similarly, Jackman mixed measure­





























































































always clear whether development promotes democracy or vice-versa. A typi­
cal problem of functionalist logic is also recurrent: the use of teleological rea­
soning, in which democracy is not explained by its causes, but by its conse­
quences (that is, by its functions). And this long tradition of research has pro­
duced only limited knowledge on the complex relationship between economies 
and political regimes and its role in the genesis of democracies; the same 
results would appear to be derived from distinct causes, and the same causes 
would appear to produce different results.
Let us consider the way in which a single result, democratization, is 
attributed to antithetical causes. Whilst many quantitative studies suggest that 
economic development promotes democratization, there is also a considerable 
body of statistical evidence that suggests that the latter more frequently occurs 
when economies are in crisis. If that is the case, transitions would be a result 
of the failure of the dictatorships’ economic management, rather than the 
‘unintended consequences’ of their economic success. Fernando Limongi and 
Adam Przeworski concluded from their analysis of the Latin American dicta­
torships between 1945 and 1988 that likelihood of democratization taking 
place was twice as high if the economy had been in crisis the previous year 
than if it had been expanding16. The democratizations from communist 
regimes or military dictatorships during the 1980s occurred in the context of 
falling GDPs in real terms, fiscal crises of the states, and overwhelming for­
eign debt burdens. These difficulties or crises were neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient cause of the collapse of the dictatorships. But they did generally un­
dermine the dictatorships’ claims to legitimacy on the grounds of their greater 
economic efficiency. Hence they shattered the cornerstone of what might be 
called the ‘authoritarian pact’: the promise of economic prosperity in return 
for political acquiescence. In this way, democratization would be the result of 
a combination of both economic and political failure.
16 Fernando Limongi and Adam Przeworski, ‘Democracy and Development in South Amer­
ica, 1946-1988’, Working Paper 1994/55 (Madrid. Center for Advanced Study in the So­
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Table 1 provides some additional information on this point17. It covers the 
period from 1951 to 1988 and contains data on the collapse of 46 democracies 
(from 94 regimes of this type) and 43 dictatorships (from a total of 107). This 
evidence shows that below a level of development of two thousand dollars per 
capita, 31 of the 38 democracies and 24 of the 67 dictatorships collapsed; 
between two and four thousand dollars, 13 of the 23 democracies and 11 of the 
21 dictatorships fell; above four thousand dollars, 2 of the 33 democracies and 
8 of the 19 dictatorships came to an end. If we take into account both the level 
of development and the annual growth rate (throughout the regime’s existence, 
although never before 1951), it can be seen that the crises of dictatorships 
were slightly more frequent when these levels and rates were high. Above all, 
however, the data show that, although both democracies and dictatorships 
proved vulnerable at low levels of per capita income, democracies were more 
vulnerable in these circumstances and when growth rates were negative or 
stagnant. In contrast, at higher income levels, the democracies were more sta­
ble than the dictatorships. Thus, these data suggest that economic development 
reinforces democracies more than dictatorships. They also raise a number of 
questions: for example, a large proportion of the dictatorships in Huntington’s 
‘transition zone’ were able to survive, whilst a notable number of democrati­
zations occurred outside that zone. But, the data have limitations: they only 
refer to cases of regime crisis; they compare regimes with very different 
lifespans; the growth rates refer to averages over sometimes very long peri­
ods, which cannot reflect those cases in which the change of regime was influ­
enced by a sharp economic downturn after a prolonged period of growth. 
Hence the table reflects the highly inconclusive nature of the relationship 
between economies and regimes. This relationship only involves ‘favourable’ 
or ‘unfavourable’ conditions; the probabilities vary very little; and other fac­
tors may play a decisive role in bringing about democratization. As a result, 
political actors possess considerable autonomy. But what seems evident is that 
the promotion of democracy requires support for its economic development, 
not the ‘modernisation’ of dictatorships.
17 Table 1 has been compiled from information provided by Adam Przeworski. From data re­
ferring to 139 countries and 238 regimes between 1950 and 1990, Przeworski argues that 
economic development does not promote democratization, and that democracies are vul­
nerable at low levels of development and negative growth rates. However, with regard to 
growth rates, aggregate data for long periods does not allow us to identify clearly the 
combination of economic development and acute crises that 1 consider lethal for many dic­
tatorships. Furthermore, his data on levels of development show that, when these surpass 
a certain threshold, democracies prove immune to crises (ie. negative growth rates). 
Przeworski’s argument is particularly pertinent in the case of poor democracies facing eco­
nomic crises. See Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, ‘Modernization: Theories and 





























































































These apparently contradictory relationships between economy and democ­
racy may be due to an analytical confusion. We have already seen that two 
contradictory causes (development and crisis) appear to have the same effect. 
Yet to what extent is this true? The contradiction may simply be due to the fact 
that we are studying different processes, which are not well reflected in the 
dependent and independent variables. Suppose, for example, that the break­
down of a dictatorship is the result of economic collapse; this breakdown 
would probably imply a traumatic rupture with the past and be followed by a 
period of profound political and economic instability, which might or might 
not lead to democracy, and, in any event, if democratization were to occur, the 
new regime would be hard-pressed to survive. Imagine, on the contrary, a 
transition coming in the wake of a long period of growth followed by a sharp 
economic crisis which would invalidate the exchange of material prosperity 
and political acquiesence. Sectors of the population would blame the interrup­
tion of economic development on the political regime; social movements cre­
ated during the period of expansion would intensify the pressure for political 
change; and democratization would be the consequence of longer term, and 
more gradual, transformations than in the first example. Provided that the 
economic crisis does not continue indefinitely, the prospects of the new regime 
becoming consolidated might be greater.
This debate over which economic conditions favour democratic transitions 
is not solely of academic interest. It may shed light on the dilemmas faced by 
new democratic governments. If democracies tend to be born in the context of 
economic crises (as was indeed the case throughout the 1980s), then these gov­
ernments will be unable to concentrate on political problems. Rather, they will 
encounter a two-fold problem: how to overcome the crisis and promote eco­
nomic development, and how to consolidate the newly established institutions. 
That is, they will not be in a position to follow the traditional advice of politi­
cal scientists: to avoid taking on economic and political reforms simultane­
ously, overloading agendas, overlapping conflicts. The economic reforms 
required to surmount the crises inevitably lead, at least temporarily, to a dete­
rioration in the living conditions of a very large part of the population. If this 
deterioration continues, the legitimacy of the new regime may be considerably 
weakened, unless the provision of political goods and social protection in case 
of need compensates for hardship. Moreover, these economic difficulties may 
erode the state’s capacity (i.e. its resources), and undermine both public order 
and the reform process itself. Indeed, these problems have been experienced 




























































































What has been the nature of the economic crisis and the policy responses to 
it? During the two decades after 1960, the GDP of the Latin American coun­
tries grew at an average annual rate of 5.2 per cent; in Eastern European 
countries, the net material product increased on average by 6.0 per cent in the 
same period. In contrast, during the five years after 1980, there was zero 
growth in Latin America, and growth of less than 1 per cent in Hungary, 
Poland, and Yugoslavia (the only communist countries for which the IMF had 
data). During the 1980s, the per capita GDP in Latin America fell by an aver­
age of 9.4 per cent; the annual inflation rate rose from 55 per cent in 1980 to 
1,260 per cent in 1990 (and topped more than 7,400 per cent in countries such 
as Peru and Nicaragua), while the per capita debt rose to 1,556 dollars in 
Argentina, 1,539 in Chile, and 769 in Brazil. In Eastern Europe, the per capita 
debt in Hungary reached 1,656 dollars (the highest of any country in the 
world), 1,113 dollars in Poland, and 444 in Czechoslovakia. The communist 
economies started to collapse as a result of their lack of competitiveness, state 
bankruptcy, the burden of price and production subsidies, the high degree of 
monopolization, the enormous imbalances in the consumer markets, and the 
low and ever-decreasing productivity of their economies.
The causes are well-known: the escalation of oil prices in 1974 and 1979; 
the changes in the international financial markets; the adoption of stiffer 
monetary polices by the industrialized creditor countries; the enormous 
increase in the cost of debts following the rise in interest rates after 1982; the 
fall in the price of exports from these debtor countries; and the radical change 
in capital flows. All this provoked a serious deterioration of the states’ 
solvency, balance of payments deficits, the stagnation or decline of the GDP in 
real terms, and very high inflation rates.
The consequences were the exhaustion of the protectionist strategies and 
populist policies which had led to an inefficient expansion of the states, exces­
sive economic regulation, uncontrolled expenditure and massive public debt. 
Both in Latin America and in Eastern Europe, states faced major fiscal crises; 
authoritarian regimes were often also bankrupt regimes. Although the new 
democratic governments in Southern Europe faced far less dramatic economic 
conditions, the difficulties were also serious in terms of the stagnation of the 
GDP (with growth rates of less than 1 per cent), rising inflation (over 20 per 
cent), the public deficit, labour costs, and employment (above all in Spain, 
where 1,950,000 jobs disappeared between 1975 and 1985, whilst unemploy­
ment went up from 4.5 to 21.9 per cent). Table 1.2 shows some of the differ­
ences in the economic conditions of a number of democratizations which took 
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The economic crisis gradually led to a change in the paradigm of economic 
policies. Thus, it was increasingly accepted that markets were efficient instru­
ments for the allocation of economic resources, that an efficient economy 
required price systems in order to reflect shortages and distribute resources, 
as well as open foreign trade to bring competition and new technologies. 
Accordingly, the reform blueprint consisted of ten main points18: tighter fiscal 
discipline; new public expenditure priorities; tax reform, consisting of widen­
ing the tax base rather than raising rates; positive, and market-determined, 
interest rates; trade liberalization and the creation of an export oriented econ­
omy; market-determined exchange rates; the removal of restrictions on direct 
foreign capital investment; the privatisation of publicly-owned companies; the 
deregulation of economic activities; and the establishment of guaranteed prop­
erty rights. These were the basic elements of the stabilization policies and 
structural economic reforms introduced in Southern Europe, Latin America, 
and Eastern Europe. The reforms enacted in Poland, Bulgaria, Rumania, the 
former Czechoslovakia, and Hungary shared such orientations; the differences 
had to with the lesser or greater scope of the reforms, the pace at which they 
were introduced, and the extent to which they were accompanied by social 
policies.
Inevitably, these reforms have harsh effects. Stabilization, structural eco­
nomic reform, and the reduction of subsidies reduce consumption and demand, 
lead to the closure of inefficient companies, higher unemployment, and lower 
real wages. Some economists believe that these costs are in fact indicators of 
the reforms’ success; at times this argument has been echoed somewhat 
masochistically by politicians. In this way, unemployment becomes a sign of 
economic efficiency. On a number of occasions, the Czech prime minister 
Vaclav Klaus had to argue that the country’s low unemployment rate was not a 
sign that his economic policy had failed, and described full employment as 
‘irrational’19. However, this does not merely imply that blood, sweat and tears 
are required from society, although that is certainly the case. The high costs of 
reforms are necessary and inevitable, but they alone do not guarantee the suc­
cess of the reform programme, and they may well prove difficult for a new 
democracy to assimilate.
18 John Williamson (ed.), Latin American Adjustment (Washington, Institute of International 
Economics, 1990), pp. 8-17.
19 When a journalist commented on the low level of unemployment in the Czech Republic, 
Klaus responded defensively, ‘that it true, but it will rise’. See his two interviews in El 




























































































Yet are democracies incapable of facing these difficulties and surviving? 
Rather than the effects of economic development on democratization, let us 
now consider the second side of the relationship between economies and politi­
cal regimes: namely the impact democracies have on development.
2. Democracy and economic efficiency
Due to the high costs of such reforms, it has often been argued that democ­
racies would find it very difficult to implement them, and that if they tried to 
do so, they would be unlikely to survive. In other words, these arguments 
questioned the democracies’ capacity to implement efficient policies at times of 
crisis, as well as the possibility that they could conserve sufficient political 
legitimacy in these circumstances.
The different interpretations of the relationship between the economy and 
political regimes can crudely be summed up in the following four theses: a) 
markets require democratic political regimes; b) markets require authoritarian 
regimes; c) democracies require markets; and d) democracies require central 
planning and public property. It is possible, in turn, to distinguish three 
sequences of economic and political reforms20. In the first sequence, economic 
reforms precede political ones. The examples cited are Chile, Southern 
Europe, South Korea, and Taiwan. In the second, economic and political 
reforms take place simultaneously. The examples used are the former Soviet 
Union, Mexico, or Nigeria. In the third sequence, political reform precede 
economic one. This would be the case of Eastern Europe, Argentina, Brazil, 
Peru, Bolivia, or Uruguay. The examples are not always fortunate: to take just 
one case, in Mexico economic reforms in the 1980s were radical, while politi­
cal reforms were very limited. But scepticism regarding the capacity of demo­
cratic regimes leads to the defence of the first sequence, (the temporal priority 
of economic reforms). At times, these doubts also inspire a preference for 
authoritarian regimes which introduce market-orientated reforms, as opposed 
to hesitant democracies. This not only implies support for the first sequence, 
but also for the second thesis mentioned above, namely that markets require 
authoritarian regimes. The following statement by the Malaysian prime minis­
20 Peter Gourevitch, ‘Democracy and Economic Policy: Elective Affinities and Circumstantial 
Conjunctures’, World Development, 21, 8 (1993), pp. 1,271-80; Stephen Haggard and 
Robert R. Kaufman, ‘Economic Adjustment and the Prospects for Democracy’, in 




























































































ter Mahathir Bin Mohammed is a good example of these pro-authoritarian 
arguments:
In the former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries, democracy 
was introduced along with the free market. The result is chaos and 
increased misery. Not only have the countries broken up, mainly 
through bloody civil wars, but there is actual recession and more hard­
ship for the people than when the Communists ruled. One may ask 
whether democracy is the means or the end. Democracy at all costs is 
not much different from Communist authoritarianism, from the barrel 
of a gun.
In contrast,
in a number of East Asian countries, while democracy is still eschewed, 
the free market has been accepted and brought prosperity. Perhaps it is 
the authoritarian stability which enabled this to happen. Should we 
enforce democracy on people who may not be able to handle it and 
destroy stability21?
Scepticism regarding the economic efficiency of democracies has usually 
been based on two arguments. The first is that democracies are more vulnera­
ble to pressure to increase immediate consumption at the expense of invest­
ment and growth. This would be the result of a collective action problem dis­
cussed by Mancur Olson, namely that although in the long term different 
social groups would benefit from cooperative sacrifices, in the short term each 
would be interested in turning economic policy into a distributive game22. 
Trade unions, in competition with each other, would lead demands for con­
sumption; the more democratic the governments, the weaker they would be; it 
would be impossible for a party to win elections with a programme entailing 
immediate sacrifices, even when promising a better future in return. This 
would result in an inefficient distribution of the national income, cuts in 
investment programmes in favour of current consumption, less freedom of 
action for business, and lower growth rates. The second argument is linked to 
the first. The state is seen as the only potentially universalistic actor, as against 
other actors who behave sub-optimally. Thus, only if the state is sufficiently
21 Speech to the Europe-East Asia Economic Forum, Hong Kong, 14 October 1992.





























































































autonomous and insulated from particularist pressures will it be possible to 
promote the economic conditions required for growth23.
The new democracies would be particularly weak in terms of their ability to 
implement unpopular austerity and adjustment programmes. This weakness 
would be all the greater when the transition was brought about by a process of 
negotiation and compromise rather than to the defeat of a dictatorship. Unless 
it is able to improve the population’s material conditions of life, the new 
regime would find it difficult to survive, its legitimacy would be fragile in 
society, and supporters of authoritarianism would maintain their power 
largely untouched. Moreover, the advent of new democratic regimes is usually 
accompanied by a multiplication of expectations. When these come up against 
the reality of economic restrictions, the likely result will be intense conflicts, 
governmental paralysis, and, eventually, populist policies. The evidence does 
indeed show that the vast majority of new democracies established in the 1980s 
experienced this multiplication of expectations. For many people, the new 
regimes not only promised political rights but also better material conditions. 
There is a wealth of information showing that this was the case in Spain. In the 
case of Chile, when the dictatorship ended a large majority of the population 
thought that democracy would promote more rapid economic development, 
control inflation more effectively, cut unemployment, solve the external debt 
problem, and reduce inequalities. The same was true in Eastern Europe. When 
asked what they associated democracy with, from 67 per cent of the 
Czechoslovaks to 91 per cent of the Rumanians said with improved economic 
conditions; and 45% of the former to 88% of the latter replied that with more 
jobs and less unemployment; and between 58% in Czechoslovakia and 80% in 
Bulgaria answered that with greater equality24.
For the sceptical vision of democracy, this data provides evidence of the 
vulnerability of the new regime’s legitimacy, and confirms that stabilization 
plans and structural reforms are extremely difficult to implement. Given that 
economic austerity generates different types of political risks, authoritarian
23 These arguments can be found in the introduction to Walter Galenson (ed.), Labor and 
Economic Development (New York, Wiley, 1959); Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order 
in Changing Societies (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 32-59, 190-208; 
Samuel P. Huntington and Jorge I. Dominguez, 'Political Development’, in Fred I. 
Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (eds.), Handbook o f Political Science vol. 3 (Reading, 
Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 33-43.
24 Antonio Alaminos, Chile: Transicion Politico y Sociedad (Madrid, Centro de Investiga- 
ciones Socioldgicas, 1991), pp. 134-37; Llszl6 Bruszt and Jdnos Simon, Political Cul­
ture, Political and Economical Orientations in Central and Eastern Europe during the 




























































































regimes would find it easier than democracies to adopt ‘orthodox’ economic 
policies. Hence this argument leads to the more or less explicit acceptance of 
the second of the theses mentioned above, namely that markets require 
authoritarian regimes. On the basis of the Latin American experience, James 
Malloy has written that
present economic policy belies the prodemocratic rhetoric because, 
among other things, it demands decision-making centres able to impose 
policies resisted by almost all segments of society. This is a task that 
prior cycles show is beyond the capacity of other democratic regimes in 
Latin America25.
Dictatorships, in contrast, would enjoy a number of advantages which 
would allow them to manage their economies more efficiently. The absence of 
electoral cycles and the lesser dependence of governments on popular support 
would increase the state’s autonomy and its capacity to impose unpopular eco­
nomic policies; their greater indifference to interest group pressures would 
reduce fiscal and budgetary problems and facilitate increased savings and 
investment; and the more limited rotation among political office holders would 
make it easier for them to adopt a longer term perspective when designing and 
executing reforms. In this sense, Haggard writes that
Institutions can overcome these collective-action dilemmas by restrain­
ing the self-interested behaviour of groups through sanctions; collective- 
action problems can be resolved by command. Since authoritarian polit­
ical arrangements give political elites autonomy from distributionist 
pressures, they increase the government’s ability to extract resources, 
provide public goods, and impose the short-term costs associated with 
efficient economic adjustment26.
Insofar as a state dominates civil society, restricting its rights and liberties, 
governments will have a greater capacity to carry out their decisions. The only 
requisite for a correct economic policy would then be that the correct deci­
sions are made. Hence the international institutions should use all their influ­
ence to this end. This is the essence of the political economy of authoritarian­
ism: strong governments which follow the advice of the international financial
25 James M. Malloy, ‘The Politics of Transition in Latin America’, in James M. Malloy and 
Mitchell A. Seligson (eds.), Authoritarians and Democrats: Regime Transitions in Latin 
America (Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh University Press, 1987), p. 249.
26 Stephen Haggard. Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics o f  Growth in the Newly In­




























































































institutions, i.e. domestic ruthlessness and external submissiveness. Neverthe­
less, whilst this might resolve the question of which regime would be more 
capable of implementing an economic policy, it tells us nothing about which 
regime has more incentives to adopt the most appropriate policy. There is no 
reason to believe that this capacity in itself necessarily leads to an efficient 
policy rather than predatory behaviour. Why should a dictator enjoying 
autonomy from social pressure serve interests other than his own? Dictator­
ships possess greater independence from organized interests, but the power 
they exercise is also more arbitrary and discretional.
The argument that authoritarian regimes are more efficient has been backed 
up by a large body of empirical research. Most of the comparative quantitative 
studies carried out between the mid-1960s and the mid-1980s came to the 
conclusion that dictatorships promoted greater economic development than 
democracies27. Evidence for the supposedly greater capacity of authoritarian 
regimes to implement tough economic policies has mainly come from Latin 
America and East Asia. In their study of eight Latin American countries 
(Chile, Mexico, Costa Rica, Colombia, Venezuela, Brazil, Peru, and 
Argentina), Robert Kaufman and Barbara Stallings found that these countries 
achieved better results in terms of inflation, public deficit and wages when 
under authoritarian regimes, whilst the economic performance of newly 
established democracies was poorer than that of consolidated democratic 
regimes28. Equally, in the case of East Asia, none of the six countries with the 
greatest rise in GDP over the last 25 years (China, Indonesia, South Korea, 
Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong) had democratic regimes (although elec­
tions had been held and a political liberalization was under way in some); in 
none was power transferred from one party to another during this period. 
These results are usually compared with the case of India, where growth was 
little over a third of that of China during the 1980s, or that of Sri Lanka, 
which grew little more than half as much as Taiwan in the same period. Pro­
ponents of this argument also frequently cite the cases of Franco’s Spain and 
Pinochet’s Chile, and somewhat paradoxically, in the former Soviet Union 
these cases were used as arguments against Mikhail Gorbachev’s political re­
forms.
27 A chronological list of these studies figures in Appendix 2.
28 Robert Kaufman and Barbara Stallings, ‘Debt and Democracy in the 1980s: The Latin 
American Experience’, in Barbara Stallings and Robert Kaufman (eds). Debt and Democ­
racy in Latin America (Boulder, Co., Westview Press, 1989), pp. 201-23. The problem 
with Kaufman’s and Stallings’s empirical evidence is that neither the data on growth rates 
and balance of payments, nor the experience of Uruguay and Mexico, appear to fit in com­




























































































Finally, the thesis that authoritarian regimes are more efficient is usually 
rounded off with another argument already examined, namely that develop­
mental dictatorships eventually lead to democracy as an unintended result of 
the ‘pluralist’ impact their economic reforms have on society. Thus, the 
sequence of changes which prioritizes economic over political reforms would 
be more favourable for both development and democracy. Andranik 
Migranian, a political scientist and advisor to Boris Yeltsin, has written in this 
sense that
it is necessary and inevitable for Russia to go through an authoritarian 
phase of political development on its road to a market economy and a 
democratic political system... The absence of a parliament and of parties 
and opposition movements capable of using the massive discontent 
against the president and the government, the control of the most impor­
tant mass media, and a monolithic executive power create, for the presi­
dent and the government, privileged possibilities to control the rise in 
social tension in a less painful way and without serious unrest29.
It is obvious that democracy is not merely of ‘instrumental’ value, that it has 
an ‘intrinsic’ value related to rights and liberties, and that this is not only 
dependent on its capacity to promote relatively greater economic development. 
Yet the impact of democracy on development is also much more complex than 
the pro-authoritarian theses suggest. This complexity can be examined both 
from empirical and theoretical perspectives.
Let us begin by examining the empirical evidence. Experience does not sug­
gest that authoritarian regimes have a special capacity to survive economic 
crises, but quite the opposite. In fact, as the crisis deepened after 1982 the 
authoritarian regimes proved particularly politically vulnerable. Transitions to 
democracy multiplied during the 1980s whilst regime involutions generally 
failed (albeit with exceptions such as Haiti, Pakistan, or Peru). Authoritarian 
regimes were also particularly sensitive to interest group pressures and many 
dictatorships were scarcely distinguished by the rigour of their economic 
policies. State fiscal crises and overwhelming foreign debt burdens were more 
often the result of the ‘developmentalism’ of dictatorships (the military 
regimes in Latin America and the communist regimes in Eastern Europe) than 
the ‘populism’ of the democracies. This was very much the experience of 
Argentina, Peru, and Brazil, Nicaragua, the Philippines, Haiti, Myanmar 
(Burma), the Central African Republic, Uganda, Zambia, or Zaire. Eastern




























































































Europe and the former Soviet Union are further examples of the same phe­
nomena, not only because they were communist regimes but also because they 
were dictatorships.
It is also true that when dictatorships were able to generate economic devel­
opment, this did in fact eventually lead to unintended processes of liberaliza­
tion and democracy. This was the case in Spain, South Korea from the early 
1980s, and Taiwan after 1987 under Chiang Ching-kuo. Moreover, above a 
certain level of economic development, countries did tend to have democratic 
regimes. Thus, whilst approximately half of all governments were democra­
cies in the 1980s, this was true of only two-fifths of the under-developed 
countries. In other words, democracies were concentrated in countries with 
developed economies, although they were not unusual (and still less impossi­
ble) in the rest. Economic growth could favour the viability of democracies, 
but democracies also facilitated development. After all, the only developed 
country in Asia was Japan. This case, along with that of Italy, undermines the 
thesis of the greater economic efficiency of dictatorships, since in neither 
country did the establishment of new democratic regimes prove an obstacle to 
post-war economic growth.
Towards the end of the 1980s, empirical comparative studies began to sub­
stantiate these impressions. The majority of these studies suggested that 
authoritarian regimes performed no better than democracies in a period of 
profound economic crisis30. Joan Nelson’s analysis of the experience of 13 
countries and 19 governments during the 1980s has shown that the dictator­
ships’ were more likely to fail: half either postponed introducing necessary 
reforms or proved incapable of implementing them successfully31. The eco­
nomic record of the democracies varied, but the governments led by Arias and 
Monge in Costa Rica, Betancur in Colombia, Aquino in the Philippines, and 
Seaga in Jamaica performed better than those of Marcos in the Philippines, 
Rawlings in Ghana, Kaunda in Zambia, or Babangida in Nigeria. The democ­
racies achieved better economic results in culturally cohesive societies, whilst 
the dictatorships performed comparatively better in those countries with 
greater ethnic, racial, or religious divisions. There were also significant
30 These studies are also listed in Appendix 2. The shift towards the conclusion that democ­
racies achieve better economic results is perceptible in those studies published after 1985.
31 Joan Nelson, ‘The Politics of Stabilization’, in Richard E. Feinberg and Valeriana Kallab 
(eds.). Adjustment Crisis in the Third World (New Brunswick, Transaction Books, 
1984), pp. 99-118; Joan Nelson (ed.). Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics o f 





























































































regional differences, since democracies achieved relatively better results in 
Latin America and Africa, whilst in Asia their economic performance differed 
little from that of the dictatorships. Karen Remmer has also shown that new 
democracies managed their economies better in terms of the evolution of their 
GDPs and the control of the deficit32.Her study of 10 Latin American coun­
tries in the period from 1982 to 1989 (with a total of 29 years of dictatorship 
and 48 years of democracy between them), shows that whilst the democracies 
grew an average of 1.6 per cent annually, the dictatorships averaged a mere 
0.3 per cent. Similarly, the democracies had an average annual public deficit 
of 3.6 per cent, compared to the 9.9 per cent of the dictatorships, even though 
in terms of unemployment (9 per cent in the democracies compared to 8.9 per 
cent in the dictatorships) both types of regimes achieved very similar results. 
On the other hand, John Helliwell concluded from his study of 98 countries 
between 1960 and 1985 that, even though “the aggregate data do not support 
any significant linkage between the level of democracy and subsequent eco­
nomic growth, ... there appear to be important but relatively unstudied indi­
rect linkages between democracy and economic growth flowing through edu­
cation’33. Insofar as the democracies devoted more attention and resources to 
education than the dictatorships, they laid the ground for future economic de­
velopment.
In view of the various political experiences considered here and the evi­
dence presented by the many studies published over the decades, the most rea­
sonable conclusion is that generalizations about the economic impact of politi­
cal regimes are unconvincing. In Brazil, for example, both authoritarian and 
democratic governments opted for more ‘heterodox’ policies than in Uruguay. 
Yet in the light of the empirical evidence available, it is certainly not possible 
to maintain that democracy hinders development, or that authoritarian regimes 
implement more efficient economic policies. I believe that Przeworski and 
Limongi are right to argue that ‘politics does matter, but regimes do not cap­
ture the relevant differences ... it does not seem to be democracy or authori­
tarianism per se that makes the difference but something else’34. But in any 
event, democracies do not show a greater propensity for economic stagnation 
or populist policies which increase the public deficit. That is, while it is not 
possible to draw very illuminating conclusions concerning the connection
32 Karen Remmer, ‘Democracy and Economic Crisis: The Latin American Experience’, 
World Politics, 42, 3 (1990), pp. 325-26.
33 Helliwell, ‘Empirical Linkages’, pp. 19 and 24.
34 Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, ‘Political Regimes and Economic Growth’, 




























































































between political regimes and economic performance from quantitative analy­
ses, no support can be drawn for the pro-authoritarian theses.
Further evidence for this conclusion comes from Table 3, which shows the 
data of regressions referring to the degree of democracy in 82 countries dur­
ing the 1980s and a series of economic indicators. The independent variable 
consists of an index based on the extent of political and civil rights and politi­
cal participation measured on a scale of 1 to a 1003 *5. The three economic indi­
cators used are: (a) economic growth rates between 1980 and 1987; (b) annual 
inflation rates between 1980 and 1990; and (c) the budget deficit as a percent­
age of the GDP in 199036.
33 This index has been calculated from the data contained in the study by Charles Humana,
World Human Rights Guide 2nd ed. (London, Economist Publications, 1986).
36 The three economic indicators have been taken from United Nations, Human Development
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The results of the regressions show that the nature of the regime had a neg­
ligible impact on growth rates (although democracy had a slight positive 
effect). Thus, the degree of democracy in 1980 explains 11.1 per cent of the 
variation in the economic growth rates between 1980 and 1987; an increase of 
one point in the democracy index produces an increase of .052 in the economic 
growth rate. At the same time, there is no statistically significant relationship 
between inflation or the public deficit and the degree of democracy in the dif­
ferent countries.
Empirical studies offer a further conclusion: independently of the fact that 
the institutional characteristics of democracy do not prejudice economic per­
formance, this type of regime is more likely to implement policies promoting 
education and equality which, in turn, reinforce democracy. According to the 
World Bank,
by developing human resources and, more particularly, by investing in 
education, countries have been found to strengthen the basis for open 
political systems ..., for a given level of income, improvements in social 
indicators are associated with freedom and liberty ... political instability 
declines not only as incomes rises, but also as education improves37.
The results of a regression analysis between the index of democracy and 
three indicators of social expenditure are given in Table 4. The three indica­
tors of social expenditure are: (1) public expenditure on social welfare as a 
proportion of the GDP in 1980; (2) public expenditure on health as a propor­
tion of the GDP in 1986; and (3) public expenditure on education in the same 
year as a proportion of GDP38.
As the index of democracy rises, so too does public expenditure on social 
welfare and education. The index of democracy accounts for 23.6 per cent of 
the variation in expenditure on social welfare, 37.3 per cent of that on health, 
and 8.4 per cent of that on education in 1986. A rise of one point in this index 
is linked to an increase of .19 in expenditure on social welfare, .06 on health, 
and .025 on education.
37 World Bank, World Development Report 1991 (Washington D.C., World Bank, 1991), 
p. 134.
38 As in Table 3, the index of democracy has been taken from Humana, World Human 
Rights Guide. The indicator of public social welfare expenditure comes from Richard J. 
Estes, The Social Progress o f Nations (New York, Praeger, 1984) and refers to 90 coun­
tries. The indicators of public health and education expenditure have been taken from the 
United Nations, Human Development Report, which was also used in Table 3 and are 
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Democratic regimes, therefore, do not manage their economies to the 
detriment of social policies. The relationship between political regimes and 
equality has been widely debated39, but comparative statistical evidence sug­
gests that democratization does not necessarily take place at the expense of 
equality. On the contrary, economic efficiency and social policies appear to be 
more compatible under democratic than authoritarian regimes. This has im­
portant consequences for the nature of the states. In democracies, these tend to 
be more complex, as well as to spend and raise more resources, largely in 
order to finance the more extensive social policies. As is well-known, Alexis 
de Tocqueville argued that, under democracy, wider social demands and a
39 The thesis that democracies promote equality has been advanced from both conservative 
and socialist standpoints since the end of the 18th century. For example, it was defended 
by John Stuart Mill during the debate on the Reform Bill of 1832, by Alexis de 
Tocqueville with respect to democracy in the United States, by Karl Kautsky and Friedrich 
Engels when discussed the effects of universal suffrage. It was also sustained by Gerhard 
Lenski in Power and Privilege (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1966). This thesis is 
usually based on the arguments that extension of the electorate brings egalitarian conse­
quences, since by transferring political influence to less privileged social groups, regimes 
become more exposed to distributive conflicts, socialist parties win greater support and in­
fluence, elections act as the expression of democratic class struggle, and all parties need to 
win workers’ votes.
Others, in contrast, have pointed out that lower class voters do not necessarily perceive in­
equality as unjust, nor do they automatically demand income redistribution. It has also 
been argued that political rights (and political participation) are not exercised equally by all 
social groups, but to a greater extent by the more privileged. Political authoritarianism may 
therefore be more egalitarian, since it limits these political differences. Examples of these 
arguments can be found in Charles R. Beitz, ‘Democracy in Developing Countries’, in 
Raymond Gaslil (ed.). Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties (New 
York, Freedom House, 1982), as well as in Samuel P. Huntington and Joan M. Nelson, 
No Easy Choice: Political Participation in Developing Countries (Cambridge, MA„ 
Harvard University Press, 1976). More recently, Stephen Haggard has argued from his 
study of South-East Asia that equality increases when labour organisations are excluded 
from the political arena, there is no strong corporatism, and labour markets are very flexi­
ble, since all these factors prevent social dualism (at the expense of unorganised groups 
which are also normally the most disadvantaged). These conditions are more likely to exist 
under authoritarian regimes. See Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery, p. 253. 
Comparative statistical studies tend to provide greater support for the thesis that democracy 
has egalitarian effects, even though these studies normally suffer from technical problems 
relating to the sample of countries considered, the measurements of democracy and the 
evaluation of inequality. Examples of comparative quantitative studies published over the 
years include Phillips Cutright, ‘Inequality: A Cross-National Analysis’, American Socio­
logical Review, 32 (1967); Harold Wilensky, The Welfare State and Equality (Berkeley, 
University of California Press, 1975); Robert W. Jackman, Politics and Social Equality 
(New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1975); Kenneth Bollen and Robert W. Jackman, 
‘Political Democracy and the Size Distribution of Income’, American Sociological Review, 
50 (1985); Edward N. Muller, ‘Democracy, Economic Development and Income Inequali­
ty’, American Sociological Review, 53 (1988); Larry Sirowy and Alex Inkeles, ‘The Ef­
fects of Democracy on Economic Growth and Inequality’, in Alex Inkeles (ed.). On Mea­




























































































greater public sensitivity to these should result in greater public expenditure 
and taxation40. Democracies have usually given rise to stronger civil societies, 
but also to states with more resources. The case of Southern Europe is 
paradigmatic of this tendency41, but as can be seen in Table 5, greater public 
expenditure and revenue appear to be common characteristics of democracies.
This table shows the results of a regression analysis between, on the one 
hand, three indices of democracy (two referring to respect for human rights in 
1980 and 1991 on a scale of one to a hundred, and the third to political partic­
ipation in 1993 on a scale of one to three), and on the other, public expendi­
ture and tax revenue as a percentage of the GDP in 199042. It can be seen that 
whilst there was no relation between the degree of democracy in 1980 and 
public expenditure, in 1991 the former explains 25.6 per cent of the variation; 
an increase of one unit on the scale of democracy is associated with a change 
of .35 in the level of public expenditure as a proportion of GDP. This inde­
pendent variable, both in the 1980 index and that of 1991, was linked to 
increased taxation; in 1991 it explains 45.3 per cent of the variation, and an 
increase of one unit in the scale of democracy led to a rise of .38 in fiscal rev­
enue as a proportion of GDP. If we consider the effect of the third index of 
democracy in 1993, this explains 16.4 per cent of the variation in public ex­
penditure, and an increase of one unit on the scale is linked to an increase of 
7.65 in expenditure; on the other hand, this index accounts for 31.4% of the 
variation in fiscal revenue, and an increase of one unit produces a rise of .18 
in revenue as a proportion of GDP. In short, different indicators of the degree 
of democracy suggest that the state tends to have more resources under 
democracy than under authoritarian regimes. Hence democracies appear to be 
characterized by no less efficient economies, by more extensive social policies, 
and by states which administer, through their revenue and expenditure, greater 
resources.
40 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (New York, Harper and Row, 1988), p. 
211, passim.
41 See the study of the Southern European experience in Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira. José 
Marfa Maravall, and Adam Przeworski, Economic Reforms in New Democracies 
(Cambridge. Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 77-131.
42 The first of these indices of democracy is based on the information contained in Charles 
Humana, World Human Rights Guide (London, Economist Publications, 1992). The sec­
ond is based on the data in Freedom House, Freedom in the World: Political Rights and 
Civil Liberties (New York, Freedom House, 1993). The data on public expenditure and 
taxation has been taken from a United Nations report published after those mentioned in 
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Finally, these comparative empirical studies also suggest that democracies 
are more resilient than dictatorships to economic crises. Not only did they 
prove less vulnerable and fragile than was expected during the 1980s, but this 
was also the case over longer periods. It is true that democracies with a very 
low level of economic development and negative growth rates are much more 
vulnerable than authoritarian regimes. However, their chances of survival 
increase considerably once a certain minimum threshold has been reached. For 
example, considering the experience of Latin America between 1945 and 
1988, Limongi and Przeworski have shown that after three years of negative 
economic growth, 91 per cent of the democracies survived the following year, 
compared to only 67 per cent of the dictatorships; and after five years of 
negative growth, 75 per cent of the democracies, but none of the dictatorships, 
survived the following year43. Similarly, Remmer’s analysis of 114 stabiliza­
tion programmes in nine Latin American countries over a period of 30 
years44 reveals that these more frequently led to the collapse of dictatorships 
than of democracies. The latter, therefore, appear to enjoy a certain autonomy 
with respect to economic conditions. Juan Linz has argued that this is a conse­
quence of the fragmentation of power and responsibility in democratic 
regimes, which helps to ensure that inefficiency does not directly impinge on 
the regime’s legitimacy45. Huntington has explained the same phenomena in 
terms of the separation between the ‘legitimacy of the rulers’, which is based 
on performance, and the ‘legitimacy of the regime’, based on rules: a crisis of 
the former would lead to a change of government, but not to a challenge to the 
regime itself46. Albert Hirschman, in turn, has linked it to the reserves of 
political support which a new regime counts on when it replaces a repressive 
and discredited dictatorship, as well as to the fact that democracy provides 
‘political goods’ which may compensate for a fall in per capita incomes47. In 
any event, the result would be that democracies have more room for manoeu­
vre than dictatorships.
Let us now consider the theoretical arguments in favour of democracy. The 
empirical evidence which shows that old and new democracies achieve better
45 Limongi and Przeworski, ‘Democracy and Development in South America’, pp. 6-11, 20- 
4.
44 Karen Remmer, ‘The Politics of Economic Stabilization: IMF Standby Programs in Latin 
America, 1954-1984’, Comparative Politics, 18 (1986), pp. 1-24.
45 Juan J. Linz, ‘Legitimacy of Democracy and the Socioeconomic System’, in Mattei Dogan 
(ed.). Comparing Pluralist Democracies (Boulder Co., Westview Press, 1988), pp. 65- 
113.
46 Huntington, The Third Wave, pp. 46-58.
4^ Albert Hirschman, ‘The Political Economy of Latin American Development: Some Exer­




























































































economic results than pro-authoritarian arguments would lead us to expect 
may be explained by the operation of democratic markets and the character of 
democratic political institutions. On occasions, some economists have main­
tained that whilst economic markets function well, political markets do not. 
However, it can be argued that democratic political markets can be very com­
petitive, that political actors may be rewarded for performing efficiently, and 
hence that the democracy may produce comparatively better results48. Elec­
toral competition may reduce the opportunist potential of politicians to lower 
levels than those found in dictatorial regimes: on the one hand, politicians win 
reputations and suffer from their failure to fulfil promises in democratic polit­
ical markets; on the other, voters have relatively more information on the 
politicians’ identity, the party ideologies, and candidates’ reputations, as well 
as about the opinions of very different people, organisations and groups. 
Democratic political institutions can also reduce transaction costs and facilitate 
the efficient exchange of rights. Majority rule itself may reduce the particular­
istic distortions which pressure groups can introduce into the political system. 
Political parties may act as aggregative agencies which universalizi interests 
and hence counterbalance the influence that sectorial or local interests may 
have on politicians. Parties and trades unions may accept inter-temporal trade­
offs and hence moderate their demands. And political leaders in democratic 
regimes usually have greater legitimacy in the event of having to appeal for 
austerity from society. Reform measures proposed by the communist govern­
ment in Poland in 1987 were rejected in a referendum, but were supported in 
1990 when they were proposed by Tadeusz Mazowiecki’s democratic govern­
ment.
Thus, the relative efficiency of dictatorships is explained in terms of their 
capacity, autonomy and insulation from society, whilst that of democracies is 
related to the existence of incentives, the responsibility of the institutions, and 
the predominance of universalistic interests. State autonomy from society is 
not necessarily a prerequisite for efficiency; not only does it fail to guarantee 
that the correct policies will be adopted, but beyond a certain point, it has 
harmful consequences for the economy. In this sense, Douglass North has 
argued that democratic institutions are those best able to restrict the state’s 
‘predatory’ instincts in the name of general interest49. According to North, 
since the political process conditions economic decisions, institutions have an 
important effect on economic exchanges. Despite the inadequacies of the vot­
48 Donald Wiuman, ‘Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results’, Journal o f  Political 
Economy, 97 (1989), pp. 1,395-424.
49 Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance 




























































































ers’ information and unequal access to the decision-making process, democra­
cies constitute the institutional framework most closely resembling a political 
market, in which transaction costs permit efficient exchanges. Democratic 
institutions facilitate information about the costs and benefits of different 
policies; due to the incentives resulting from political competition, they also 
transmit the most efficient preferences and decisions better than authoritarian 
institutions do.
Jean Dr£ze and Amartya Sen have used similar arguments to explain why 
democracies may be more economically efficient. Their analysis focuses on 
extreme cases: the prevention of famines and the reduction of severe hardship 
in the Third World. In dictatorships, leaders do not suffer the consequences of 
their policies. ‘The contribution of political pluralism relates to the importance 
of adversarial politics and social criticism in influencing state action in the 
direction of greater sensitivity to the well-being of the population. ... it is clear 
that the scope for effective public influence on the activities of the state tends 
to be grelter in political systems that make room for opposition and criti­
cism’50. In contrast, when there are no elections, when opposition parties are 
not tolerated, nor public and uncensored criticism permitted, governments do 
not have to pay politically for their mistakes. If democracy is defined as a 
regime endowed with a system of incentives capable of making governmental 
policy sensitive to results, then economic efficiency would not only benefit 
from the economic incentives introduced by the market, but also from the 
political incentives derived from democracy. If a free press is able to disclose 
information which might influence policies, it may also act as an early warn­
ing system and cause mistakes to be corrected. Thus, political incentives and 
information may help to explain the contrast between the experiences of 
famine in India before and after 1947, or in Botswana and Zimbabwe in com­
parison to Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Chad, Mali, or Uganda, despite the exis­
tence of similar material conditions.
It is true that these arguments concerning the reasons for the greater eco­
nomic efficiency of democracy assume the existence of perfect information 
among voters and perfect competition among parties. Yet it is equally true that 
these assumptions need only be relative; the arguments remain valid provided 
that dictatorships and democracies differ in terms of the degree of competition 
and information found within them. And insofar as these arguments are plau­
sible, they undermine both the thesis that markets require authoritarian
50 Jean Drfeze and Amartya Sen, Hunger and Public Action (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 




























































































regimes and the sequence which gives priority to economic rather than politi­
cal reforms. That is, they invalidate the ideas that defend an authoritarian path 
to an efficient market economy. In its 1991 report on the comparative per­
spectives for economic development, the World Bank noted that
there is suggestive evidence that links features of democratic systems 
positively with overall aspects of development and welfare... Political 
checks and balances, a free press, and open debate on the costs and ben­
efits of government policy could give a wider public a stake in reform. 
The need to produce good results in order to be reelected could help, 
rather than hinder, economic change51.
However, these arguments focus above all on the incentives which explain 
why democracies may generate better outcomes. In contrast, they have little to 
say about their capacity to do so. To what extent are democracies able to man­
age their economies in the face of the pressures of electoral interest and par­
ticularistic groups? Obviously, there is no simple answer to this question. 
Although Haggard argues that authoritarian regimes are relatively more 
capable, he recognises that ‘there are no theoretical reasons to think that 
authoritarian regimes are uniquely capable of solving the collective-action 
problems associated with development’, and that ‘there are no unique institu­
tional solutions for reducing the political constraints on economic policy’52. 
What alternatives to the authoritarian mechanisms, therefore, may provide 
democracies with the capacity to implement their policies?
These alternatives depend on four conditions: the gravity of the economic 
crisis, the breadth of the mandate, the extent of the political consensus, and the 
sequence of decisions. When economic crises were profound and prolonged, 
and were not caused by uncontrollable external circumstances, governments 
more readily accepted that economic measures had to be taken, that these rep­
resented the best available option, and that they had no room for manoeuvre 
nor delay in taking decisions53. This mechanism of urgency helps explain 
many democratic governments’ response to the economic crises of the 1980s: 
it operated in Spain in 1982, in Portugal in 1983, in Argentina in 1989, and in 
Poland in the same year. When crises were accompanied by a frustrating 
experience of partial reforms that had failed to modify the evolution of their
51 World Bank, World Development Report 1991, pp. 134, 133.
52 Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery, pp. 256, 267.
53 Nelson (ed.). Economic Crisis and Policy Choice, pp. 325-27; John Waterbury, ‘The 
Heart of the Matter? Public Enterprise and the Adjustment Process’, in Haggard and 




























































































economies, governments proved more willing to abandon this type of response 
and opt for a radical change of economic policy. The policies of macroeco­
nomic adjustment and structural reform applied in Latin America and Eastern 
Europe were the response to many years of timid reforms and voluntarist 
experiments. In countries such as Hungary or Poland, partial reforms designed 
to give enterprises a degree of autonomy, introduce greater competition, and 
further open up economies to foreign trade, failed to resolve the basic struc­
tural problems. Economic decisions were still taken according to political cri­
teria, autonomy remained limited, the power of the state monopolies was not 
reduced, competition hardly increased, unprofitable enterprises continued to 
survive on the basis of subsidies and considerable fiscal laxity, and labour costs 
carried on rising. In countries such as Argentina, Brazil, or Peru, the hetero­
dox experiments of the 1980s ended in failure: after an initial period of 
euphoria provoked by the apparent fall in inflation, the economic crises wors­
ened due to the absence of fiscal reforms, undisciplined monetary policies, 
acquiescence in the face of demands for consumption, and the growing bur­
dens on the states. Both in Latin America and Eastern Europe the situation 
became unsustainable. Paradoxically, as the crisis deepened, the governments’ 
capacity to initiate policies of macroeconomic austerity and structural trans­
formation increased, since both politicians and society as a whole came to the 
conclusion that there was no other alternative. Deep and prolonged crises can 
generate processes of collective learning from previous experiences. Learning 
processes of this type occurred in Southern Europe: in Portugal, derived from 
the failure of the economic policies of the ‘revolution of the carnations’; in 
Spain, after various years of economic decline and in the light of the failed 
experiences of Portugal, of France between 1981 and 1982, and of Great 
Britain during the 1970s. The crisis forced decisions to be taken and experi­
ence helped when choosing between different policies.
However, the economic crisis was not usually a sufficient condition for the 
implementation of drastic economic reforms. In many cases, coalitions of 
groups that had benefited from existing policies organised to block any change 
of direction. This was clearly true in Russia, but many other examples also 
exist. In this context, a breakdown of the existing political formula, in the 
sense of a transformation of the status quo, or the end of an ‘historical com­
promise’, became necessary to enable a new government to choose a new eco­
nomic policy paradigm. The mandate enjoyed by democratic governments was 
therefore another essential condition that reinforced their political capacity. As 




























































































port to be strong’54. The breadth of the governments’ mandate depended on 
the extent of their electoral victory and was manifested in two ways: through 
the governments’ parliamentary strength and the social support they enjoyed. 
John Keeler has shown that this strength and support, which he terms empow­
erment and authorization, were the principal explanatory factors behind the 
very different reforms initiated by Roosevelt, Blum, Attlee, Johnson, Allende, 
Reagan, and Mitterrand55. Broad mandates, combined with acute economic 
crises, generally imply that the opposition is thrown into temporary disarray 
and previous policies are discredited. In addition, innovative teams, backed by 
strong leaders, are able to seize the reins of the economy. This is what hap­
pened in the cases of Pedro Aspe in Mexico, Miguel Boyer and Carlos 
Solchaga in Spain, Leszek Balcerowicz in Poland, three examples of what John 
Waterbury has labelled change teams56. The protection they received from a 
leader with wide popular and political support granted them a considerable 
degree of autonomy.
Thus, the capacity of democratic governments increased when they had 
broad mandates, when parliamentary and social resistance receded, and when 
alternative policies had been discredited. These effects multiplied when the 
political institutions provided governments with additional leeway for deci­
sion-making. The choice of different electoral systems, presidentialism or 
parliamentarism, centralism or federalism, constitutionalism or the majority 
principle, neo-corporatism or pluralism, have significant implications for eco­
nomic policy. At one extreme, the institutions may paralyse decisions and their 
implementation. But at the other, they may engender governments which are 
insensitive to the balance of forces in parliament, or uninterested in dialogue 
and negotiation. Whilst a government’s capacity may increase under conditions 
which promote ‘decisionism’, these may also foment political insulation which 
reduces the information and incentives necessary for the selection of efficient 
policies. For this reason, Nelson argues that ‘economic reform cannot long be 
isolated from politics and ... politics is not always the enemy of such 
reforms’57. Governments have to listen, negotiate and persuade, both to 
increase the information at their disposal and to win greater support for their 
policies. Past the moment when a situation of acute crisis may require urgent
54 Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times (Ithaca, NY., Cornell University Press, 1986), 
p. 238.
55 John T. S. Keeler, ‘Opening the Window for Reform: Mandates, Crises, and Extraordi­
nary Policy Making’, Comparative Political Studies, 25,4 (1993), pp. 427-86.
56 Waterbury, T he Heart of the Matter?’, p. 191.
57 Joan Nelson, ‘The Politics of Economic Transformation. Is Third World Experience Rele­




























































































economic measures, governments need to consult and reach agreement if their 
policies are to be viable and they are to obtain information and cooperation 
from key social actors. In this way, whilst broad mandates help, they do not 
constitute a necessary or sufficient condition for the implementation of eco­
nomic reforms. As illustrated by the case of the Ambal Cavaco Silva govern­
ment in Portugal after the 1985 elections, minority governments with an ini­
tially limited mandate may also be both capable and efficient. The empirical 
evidence available on the relative economic performance of majority and mi­
nority governments is, in fact, far from conclusive. Consensus, both among 
politicians and in society as a whole, may therefore be a functional alternative 
to a broad electoral mandate. Politicians may share the view that there are no 
options other than those proposed by the government; and society may also 
come to believe that there is no alternative to these policies, that they will 
probably lead to a better future, that it is rational to maximize the present 
value of future consumption, and that the costs and benefits of these policies 
are fairly distributed. In this case, consensus and agreement may open a 
‘window of opportunity’ for ambitious economic policies to be initiated.
However, neither mandates nor consensuses last forever. In time, ‘windows 
of opportunity’ close, honeymoon periods come to an end, and governments 
wear themselves out. For this reason, strategies are of crucial importance. A 
government’s capacity and efficiency are not solely dependent on political and 
economic conditions, but also on the temporal sequences o f policies. Policies 
do not take place in a single moment of time, but constitute a process which 
develops in changing circumstances. The strategic dilemmas concern, above 
all, two interrelated issues. On the one hand, the calendar of initiatives, on the 
other, negotiation or ‘decisionism’. Generally speaking, initiatives taken early 
on in a mandate have more chance of success, since governments are new, they 
enjoy public confidence which has yet to be exhausted, and are supported by 
cohesive parties, whilst the opposition has only recently been defeated. Rapid 
reforms will meet with less resistance, their costs will be absorbed more 
quickly, and policies will appear more difficult to reverse. However, the 
passing of time will erode trust in governments and their initiatives, and 
cracks may appear in their party support. For all these reasons, lost opportu­
nities usually prove expensive for policies. Hence Przeworski has argued that 
economic reforms must be both rapid and radical. In Eastern Europe, ‘radical 
programs are more likely to advance reforms farther under democratic con­




























































































reverse58. Initiatives will be more readily accepted by society if they scrupu­
lously follow channels of democratic debate and are complemented by social 
polices that lessen the costs involved.
The second dilemma refers to the choice between ‘decisionist’ or ‘pactist’ 
strategies. This dilemma is connected with the previous one. In the early days 
of a government, the ‘decisionist’ option will generally be easier. Later, in 
contrast, as the ‘windows of opportunity’ gradually close, governments tend to 
opt for a strategy based on agreement and pacts. The erosion caused by time 
and the shrinking of the mandate are not the only factors influencing this 
dilemma, however. Both the ideology of the governments and the nature of the 
reforms influence the choice of strategies. Thus, social democracy has tended 
towards negotiation and neo-corporatist strategies. In contrast, Margaret 
Thatcher’s strategy was a very clear example of ‘decisionism’; as she herself 
would say, ‘social dialogue’ means voting every five years. Certain reforms, in 
turn, require decisiveness and surprise, whilst others demand negotiation and 
persuasion. A devaluation is one thing, fiscal reform quite another.
The economic efficiency of democracy may, therefore, be a product of both 
the functioning of incentives and political information, and of mechanisms 
which reinforce its political capacity59. Among these, I have emphasized the 
gravity of the crisis, the breadth of the mandate, the extent of the consensus, 
and the election of temporal strategies. These mechanisms may be both accu­
mulative and compensatory; they offer possibilities but determine nothing; it is 
unlikely that they operate as a necessary cause and they certainly do not consti­
tute a sufficient one. Ultimately, other, rather intangible factors such as lead­
ership and the cognitive maps of politicians play a decisive role. It is up to 
leaders to take advantage of political conditions; many waste favourable 
opportunities, whilst others, in contrast, are able to develop their economies 
even under unfavourable conditions. In any case, Gourevitch is right to argue 
that ‘policies need politics’; the thesis that strong or authoritarian governments 
generate more efficient economies is usually based on a very crude conception 
of politics60.
58 Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1991), chp. 4.
59 The importance of the democratic process and social policies for economic reform strate­
gies has been heavily emphasized in Bresser Pereira. Maravall, and Przeworski, Economic 
Reforms in New Democracies, especially, pp. 199-220.




























































































To sum up, in this paper I have explored the relationship between political 
regimes and economies from two perspectives. On the one hand, I have exam­
ined the economic conditions which usually precede democratizations and the 
extent to which they favour or hinder political change and the consolidation of 
a new regime. On the other, I have considered the relative capacity of both 
types of regime to manage their economies and reform these when they enter 
into crisis. I have argued that the fatalistic thesis regarding the economic effi­
ciency of the new democracies and their possibilities of surviving amidst seri­
ous difficulties is quite unfounded. In many places in Latin America and 
Eastern Europe these observations are neither obvious nor irrelevant. I have 
also argued that economic outcomes have not been combined with greater 
inequality. Democracies have tended to be associated with broader social and 
fiscal policies. Important differences have, of course, existed between the new 
democracies in terms of the political strategies and the socio-economic for­
mula they have adopted in response to crisis. These differences have influ­
enced, in turn, both the level of political support as well as the social distribu­
tion of the economic costs and benefits of policies. However, these variations 





























































































Appendix 1. The impact of economies on regimes:
a chronology of comparative quantitative studies
Seymour Martin Lipset, ‘Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic 
Development and Political Legitimacy’, American Political Science Review, 53 
(1959). Study of 46 European, English-speaking, and Latin American coun­
tries. Conclusion: positive effect of 13 indices of development on democracy.
James S. Coleman, ‘Conclusion. The Political Systems of Developing Areas’, 
in Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.), The Politics of Develop­
ing Areas (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1960). Study of 75 coun­
tries. Conclusion: positive effect of development on democracy.
Phillips Cutright, ‘National Political Development: Measurement and Analy­
sis’, American Sociological Review, 28 (1963). Study of 77 countries between 
1940 and 1961. Conclusion: positive effect of development on democracy.
Bruce M. Russett, Trends in World Politics (New York, Macmillan, 1965). 
Study of 89 countries. Conclusion: positive effect of development on democ­
racy. ,
Deane E. Neubauer, ‘Some Conditions of Democracy’, American Political Sci­
ence Review, 61 (1967). Study of 23 countries. Conclusion: weak effect of de­
velopment (through the expansion of communications).
Donald J. McCrone and Charles F. Cnudde, ‘Toward A Communications The­
ory of Democratic Political Development: A Causal Model’, American Politi­
cal Science Review, 61 (1967). Re-examination of Cutright’s data for 77 
countries. Conclusion: positive effect of development on democracy, through 
the spread of communications due to education and urbanization.
Mancur E. Olsen, ‘Multivariate Analysis of National Political Development’, 
American Sociological Review, 35 (1968). Study of 115 countries. Conclusion: 
positive effect of development on democracy.
Phillips Cutright and James A. Wiley, ‘Modernization and Political Represen­
tation: 1927-1966’, Studies in Comparative International Development, 5 
(1969). Study of 40 countries between 1927 and 1966. Conclusion: positive ef­




























































































Arthur K. Smith, ‘Socioeconomic Development and Political Democracy: A 
Causal Analysis’, Midwest Journal o f Political Science, 13 (1969). Study of 
110 countries between 1946 and 1955. Conclusion: positive effect of develop­
ment on democracy, except in sub-Saharan Africa.
Gilbert R. Winham, ‘Political Development and Lemer’s Theory: Further Test 
of a Causal Model’, American Political Science Review, 64 (1970). Longitudi­
nal study of the United States. Conclusion: positive effect of development on 
democracy, above all through education and communications.
Arthur S. Banks, ‘Modernization and Political Change: the Latin American 
and Amer-European Nations’, Comparative Political Studies, 2 (1970). Study 
of 36 countries between 1868 and 1963. Conclusion: positive effect of devel­
opment on democracy.
Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1971). Study 
of 144 countries around 1969. Conclusion: positive effect of development on 
democracy
William Flanigan and Edwin Fogelman, ‘Patterns of Political Development 
and Democratization: A Quantitative Analysis’, in John V. Gillespie and Betty 
A. Nesvold (eds.), Macro-Quantitative Analysis: Conflict, Development and 
Democratization (Beverly Hills, Sage, 1971). Study of 29 countries between 
1800 and 1960. Conclusion: positive effect, in terms of both stability and per­
sistence, of development on democracy.
Robert W. Jackman, ‘On the Relation of Economic Development to Demo­
cratic Performance’, American Journal o f Political Science, 17 (1973). Study 
of 60 countries. Conclusion: positive effect, but in a curvilinear relation.
Philip Coulter, Social Mobilization and Liberal Democracy (Lexington, MA., 
Lexington Books, 1975). Study of 85 countries. Conclusion: positive effect of 
development on democracy.
Kenneth A. Bollen, ‘Political Democracy and the Timing of Development’, 
American Sociological Review, 44 (1979). Study of 99 countries. Conclusion: 
positive effect of development on democracy.
George M. Thomas, Francisco O. Ramirez, John W. Meyer, and Jeanne G. 
Gobalet, ‘Maintaining National Boundaries in the World System: The Rise of 




























































































Development and the World System (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 
1979). Study of 102 countries between 1950 and 1965 and between 1960 and 
1975. Conclusion: positive effect of development on democracy.
Kenneth A. Bollen, ‘Issues in the Comparative Measurement of Political 
Democracy’, American Sociological Review, 45, 3 (1980). Data on 113 coun­
tries in 1960 and 123 in 1965. Conclusion: positive effect of development on 
democracy.
Larry Diamond, ‘The Social Foundations of Democracy: The Case of Nigeria’, 
Ph. D. thesis (Stanford University, 1980). Calculations referring to 123 coun­
tries. Conclusion: positive effect of development on democracy.
Michael T. Hannan and Glenn R. Carroll, ‘Dynamics of Formal Political 
Structure: An Event-History Analysis’, American Sociological Review, 46 
(1981). Study of 90 countries between 1950 and 1975. Conclusion: develop­
ment stabilizes dictatorships.
G. Bingham Powell Jr., Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stabilir}’ 
and Violence (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1982). Data for 29 
countries between 1965 and 1972. Conclusion: positive effect of development 
on democracy.
Kenneth A. Bollen and Robert W. Jackman, ‘World System Position, Depen­
dency and Democracy: The Cross-National Evidence’, American Sociological 
Review, 48 (1983). Conclusion: if countries are situated on the periphery or 
semi-periphery of the world economy, the effect of development on democ­
racy is less probable.
Samuel P. Huntington, ‘Will More Countries Become Democratic?’, Political 
Science Quarterly, 99, 2 (1984). Study of 120 countries in 1981. Conclusion: 
development promotes democratization.
Kenneth A. Bollen and Robert W. Jackman, ‘Economic and Non-Economic 
Determinants of Political Democracy in the 1960s’, Research in Political So­
ciology, 1 (1985). Study of 109 countries between 1960 and 1965. Conclusion: 
positive effect of development on democracy, but in a curvilinear relation.
Glaucio A. D. Soares, ‘Desenvolvimento econòmico e democracia na America 




























































































speaking world, and Latin America. Conclusion: development has effects on 
democracy in the first two regions, but not in the third.
Zehra F. Arat, ‘Democracy and Economic Development: Modernization The­
ory Revisited’, Comparative Politics, 21, 1 (1988). Study of 130 countries 
between 1948 and 1977. Conclusion: the level of development is not a suffi­
cient condition for democratization.
John F. Helliwell, ‘Empirical Linkages between Democracy and Economic 
Growth’, NBER Working Paper 4066 (Cambridge, MA., National Bureau of 
Economic Research, 1992). Study of 90 countries between 1960 and 1985. 
Conclusion: positive effect of development on democracy
Larry Diamond, ‘Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered’, in 
Gary Marks and Larry Diamond (eds.), Reexamining Democracy (Newbury 
Park, CA., Sage Publications, 1992). Study of 142 countries between 1989 and 
1990. Conclusion: positive effect of development on democracy
Seymour M. Lipset, Kyoung-Ryung Seong, and John C. Torres, ‘A Compara­
tive Analysis of the Social Requisites of Democracy’, International Social Sci­
ence Journal, 136 (1993). Study of 104 countries in 1960, 1965, 1975, 1980, 
and 1985. Conclusion: positive effect of development on democracy.
Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, ‘Modernization: Theories and 
Facts’ (unpublished manuscript, 1994). Study of 139 countries between 1950 
and 1990. Conclusion: development is irrelevant for the establishment of 
democracies, but the growth rate is crucial for the survival of regimes.
Ross E. Burkhart and Michael S. Lewis-Beck, ‘Comparative Democracy: The 
Economic Development Thesis’, American Political Science Review, 88, 4 
(1994). Study of 131 countries between 1972 and 1989. Conclusion: the level 




























































































Appendix 2. The impact of regimes on economies:
a chronology of comparative quantitative studies
Adam Przeworski, ‘Party Systems and Economic Development’, Ph.D. thesis 
(Northwestern University, 1966). Study of 57 countries between 1949 and 
1963. Conclusion: Mobilizing dictatorships in middle levels of development, 
followed by democracies, promote development most.
Irma Adelman and Cynthia F. Morris, Society', Politics, and Economic Devel­
opment (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967). Study of 74 coun­
tries between 1950 and 1964. Conclusion: dictatorships have some positive ef­
fects at low or middle levels of development, but not at higher levels.
Ivo K. Feierabend and Rosalind L. Feierabend, ‘Coerciveness and Change: 
Cross-National Trends’, American Behavioral Scientist, 15 (1972). Study of 
84 countries before 1965. Conclusion: there is no difference.
William G. Dick, ‘Authoritarian versus Nonauthoritarian Approaches to Eco­
nomic Development’, Journal of Political Economy, 82 (1974). Study of 59 
underdeveloped countries between 1959 and 1968. Conclusion: democracies 
generate more growth.
Samuel P. Huntington and Jorge I. Dominguez, ‘Political Development’, in 
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